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"Citizen journalism" in the Syrian uprising:  
Problematizing Western narratives in a local context" 
Omar Al-Ghazzi 
 
Introduction 
  
For the past decade, citizen journalism has been a popular discursive frame in describing 
different kinds of digital media practices. In relation to news, the concept refers to the use of 
GLJLWDOPHGLDE\³ordinary individuals (who) temporarily adopt the role of a journalist in order to 
participate in newsmaking, often spontaneously during a time of crisis, accident, tragedy or 
disaster when they happen to be present on the scene´Allan, 2013, p. 9). The term has been 
propagated by Western news organizations, academics, and NGOs. In this article, through a 
focus on amateur videos, I distinguish between narratives about digital media and actual digital 
media practices. I focus on the case of the Arab uprisings, particularly in Syria, to show the 
multiplicity of actors and possible motivations involved in digital media practices² and contrast 
that with the frame of citizen journalism. I approach the study of journalism from the discursive 
perspective (See: Andén-Papadopoulos & Pantti, 2013, Deuze, 2005; Zelizer, 1992, 1993) by 
examining the political narratives that dominated the framing of digital communication in the 
Arab uprisings.  
The Arab uprisings are the latest world event that has generated a lot of discourse about 
citizen journalism. In the uprisings, political activists, ordinary people, armed rebels, state 
agents, soldiers, and torturers have all used digital media for different purposes² making it 
difficult to assess whether digital media are used to witness or to stage an event, to lobby for a 
cause or report on a story. They were instrumental in efforts to mobilize political action against 
brutal dictatorships, but they were also used as a weapon of war and tool of torture. This 
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complexity is concealed by the narrative of citizen journalism that foregrounds citizenship and 
journalism as prisms to understand digital media practices. As Allen (2013) argues, when linked 
to democratization, citizen journaliVPEHFRPHV³in danger of conceptual collapse under the sheer 
ZHLJKWRIWKHEXUGHQLWLVEHLQJDVNHGWRVXVWDLQ´p. 201). Within the context of Syria and more 
broadly, the meanings that determine the congruence²or the lack thereof² between the citizen 
journalism narrative and digital media practices, are shaped by the interaction between activist 
networks and news media. Each deliberates and frames these practices around notions of 
amateurism, witnessing and authenticity (See Markham, 2011).  
In response to the renewed call put forth in this special issue to engage with the notion of 
³GH-Westernizing´communication studies, I explore how the concept of citizen journalism takes 
shape in interaction and reaction to developments in the rest of the world. The citizen journalism 
frame projects the liberal democratic values implied in both journalism and citizenship on 
myriad and vastly different situations and contexts. The citizen journalism narrative 
inadvertently also centers the nation-state as the political space through which to conceive the 
use of new technologies. In Western tradition, citizenship describes the relation between an 
individual and the state-bound national polity, while journalism is currently seen as one of the 
pillars of deliberative democracy in a nation-state. The framing of digital media as citizen 
journalism invokes the values implied in both concepts. In analyzing the use of the term in Iran, 
Khiabany and Sreberny (2009) contend: 
³When such a neologism is applied to a very different setting, some interesting questions 
are triggered. These include a critique of the export of such notions to different contexts; 
that is to say, do conceptualizations developed in particular locations necessarily travel and 
travel well? But the opposite kind of critique is also important: what kind of questions does 
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this new concept raise about the assumptions underlying both journalism and citizenship 
elsewhere?´ (p. 121) 
In response, this paper asks, what tropes, emanating from the West, are used to describe digital 
media practices in the Arab world? And how do they relate to the local context of digital media 
use? In addition, what nuances and historic debates are ignored when journalism and citizenship 
are used as universal concepts? 
Against the backdrop of empirical examples of digital videos from the Arab uprisings, 
particularly the situation in Syria, I follow a dual approach that takes into account both the 
changing Western narratives about new technologies and the local contexts in which digital 
media are used. Context is defined by the particular intellectual history, political milieu in 
question, and SHRSOH¶Vlocally-situated agency (Chung, 2013).  Disentangling different forms of 
digital media practices is then necessary in order to contribute to addressing the question, posed 
by Chouliaraki (2012a³XQGHUZKDWFRQGLWLRQVPD\FRQYHUJHQWMRXUQDOLVPIDFLOLWDWHWKH
articulation of ordinary voice by non-:HVWHUQRWKHUV"´p. 270)  
The first part of the article distances digital media practices from the changing Western 
narratives about new technologies, such as the popular frame of citizen journalism, or the post 
9/11 discourse about terrorism and new media. The second part highlights the genealogy and 
history of the concepts of citizenship and journalism in an Arab context. The larger point is that 
citizenship and journalism are not universal categories and that the agency of digital media users 
should not be assumed as citizen or journalist, when the meanings of both concepts are 
contextual.  
Through the monitoring of videos emanating from the Syrian conflict and shared on 
social media, from March 2011 to August 2014, I engage with examples that have instigated 
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extensive discussions in news media reports and press editorials, in addition to social media sites. 
I analyze these video by paying particular attention to the following criteria: the subject matter, 
the intentionality and identity of the producer, the timing RIWKHYLGHR¶VSURGXFWLRQwithin the 
Syrian conflict, and the amateur or professional quality of the video. 
Digital media practices in the Syrian uprising 
The success of Tunisian and Egyptian activists in using social media to organize mass 
protests that forced their couQWULHV¶SUHVLGHQWVWRVWHSGRZQ lent credence to the belief that the 
use of digital technologies by citizens strengthens democracy or allows it to take shape. In fact, 
as a result of the attention to the role of new media in the uprisings, the translation of the term 
citizen journalism in Arabic (sahafat al-muwatana) has been propagated by international NGOs 
and news media. $QRQOLQHVHDUFKIRUWKHWHUP³FLWL]HQMRXUQDOLVP´DQG³$UDE6SULQJ´UHYHDOV
the diversity of acts referred to as citizen journalism in major US and British news sources. The 
term  mainly centers around two acts: witnessing² when ordinary people document and 
distribute reports and images of events they encounter² and activism, the strategic media output 
and contribution of political activists and dissidents whether videos, images or social media 
participation. The two modes of digital media practice are not mutually exclusive. Witnessing 
can be strategic (Ristovska, 2013) and activism can take the form of witnessing and reporting, 
especially in contexts like post-2011 Syria where the ruling regime banned journalists from 
reporting. In other words, the citizen journalist can be a neutral witness or an activist for a civic 
cause.  
In the United States, the term citizen journalism began to be used in news discourse in 
2001 to describe footage and reports taken or made by amateur witnesses during the 9/11 attacks 
(Allan, 2013). With the fast diffusion of digital technologies across the world, legacy media and 
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the public increasingly expected and relied on the media contributions of ordinary people in 
breaking and making news during exceptional events such as wars, bombings, and natural 
disasters. As Zelizer (2007) contends, news media started outsourcing the role of the eye-witness 
WRFODLPWKDWWKH\³³KDYHEHHQWKHUH´DVZLWQHVVHVRIHYHQWVWKH\KDYHQRWZLWQHVVHG´S 
Through the frame of citizen journalism, witness accounts have been used to report events like 
the tsunami in 2004, the London bombings and hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Mumbai attacks in 
2008, and most recently the Arab uprisings of 2011 (Allan, 2013).  
5RGULJXH]ZKRZDVRQHRIWKHILUVWDFDGHPLFVWRSURSDJDWHWKHWHUP³FLWL]HQ
PHGLD´VDZLWDVDZD\WRFRXQWHUWKHIUDPLQJRIPHGLDDFWLYLVPDV³DOWHUQDWLYHPHGLD´6KH
contends that a focus on the citizen enablHVD³EUHDNDZD\IURPWKHWUDGLWLRQDOVWDWLFDQG
HVVHQWLDOLVWGHILQLWLRQVRIGHPRFUDF\FLWL]HQVKLSDQGGHPRFUDWLFFRPPXQLFDWLYHDFWLRQ´p. 4). 
However, currently, the descriptor of citizen journalism has become ubiquitous² leaving little 
conceptual space for a nuanced discussion of digital media. For instance, are we to assume that 
an act of citizen journalism by a European tourist witnessing the tsunami is of the same genre as 
a Syrian activist advocating for political freedom in his country? And why do we use the notions 
of citizenship and journalism in contexts, like the Arab world, that have different conceptions 
and practices of the two notions? I will return to the second question later in the article.  
Dahlgren (2009) suggests that what binds citizen journalist witnessing and activism is the 
DVVXPHGLQWHQWLRQRIWKHXVHRIGLJLWDOPHGLDZKLFKLVWKH³FLYLFDJHQF\´RIWKHXVHUSURGXFHU
He GHILQHV³FLYLF´DVFDUU\LQJ³WKHLPSOLFDWLRQRIHQJDJHPHQWLQSXEOLFOLIH±a cornerstone of 
GHPRFUDF\´p. 58DQG³µFLYLFDJHQF\¶ DVDIXQGDPHQWDOQRWLRQWRFRQFHSWXDOO\DQFKRUSHRSOH¶V
HQDFWPHQWRIFLWL]HQVKLS´p. 59). He cautions that civic qualities should not be attributed to 
³groups that espouse, for example, neofascism, racism, terrorism, or hate. Here the µcivic¶ takes 
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the high road and parts company frRPWKDWZKLFKLVPHUHO\µSXEOLF¶´ (59). But how can one 
distinguish between these contentious concepts? Who determines which digital media practices 
HVSRXVH³KDWH´DQGZKLFKDUHFLYLFZKLFKDUHMRXUQDOLVWic acts and which are not? 
Compared to other Arab uprisings, the Syrian revolt has arguably featured the widest 
range of examples of digital and social media content produced and distributed by a host of 
political activists, witnesses, rebels, state agents, soldiers, and torturers. This complex digital 
media output was simplified by the frame of citizen journalism. Journalists initially celebrated 
social media as central for mobilization and democratization, yet social media were ignored 
when their use did not adhere to this simplistic narrative. For example, the use of social media to 
mobilize for and document controversial political activities at the outset of the uprisings, such as 
the storming of embassies, was largely ignored by legacy media commentary. At the beginning 
of the uprising, digital media featured strongly in the stories of how protestors used their cell 
phones, Facebook, Twitter, and Skype to connect, mobilize, document, and witness. On the other 
hand, when regime thugs, known in Syria as shabiha, simultaneously used the same technologies 
to intimidate and terrorize the rebelling population² no claims were made about digital 
technologies. 
Indeed, there are many examples of digital media use that blur the lines between 
witnessing an event and staging it, between professional and amateur productions, and between 
civic and violent intentions. This complexity is ignored by Western news media, which project 
authenticity on the selected output of Syrian activists² based ³on the fallacious conditions of 
DPDWHXULVPDQGORFDOLVPWKHLUSHUFHLYHGH[RWLFLVPRUPRUHOLNHO\«WKHLUYLDELOLW\DVHPSW\
signifiers into which Western foreign editors, reporters and audiences can project their 
democratizing credentials´Markham, 2011, p. 148). In the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 
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March 2011, both the protests and the amateur digitally-shot and distributed videos about them 
were of an experimental nature. Protest chants seemed spontaneous² improvised and cried out 
at the spur of the moment. One of the early YLGHRVLQWKHFLW\RI'DUD¶DVKRZV6\ULDQVVLPSO\
cKDQWLQJ³QRPRUHIHDU´³+DODEL\RIL´² which contrasts with the elaborate songs, 
chants, and slogans of later protests. In another early amateur video from Damascus, we hear the 
person shooting the video switching back and forth between classical Arabic and the Syrian 
GLDOHFWVHHPLQJO\XQVXUHRIWKHIRUPDOLW\RIDGLJLWDODFWLYLVWYLGHR³EDYHDODQ´$VWKH
Syrian uprising progressed, activists became aware of some tropes of production to help them get 
their message across to viewers. Amidst the media blackout imposed by the regime, and its 
DFFXVDWLRQVWKDWYLGHRVRIWKHXSULVLQJZHUHLQDXWKHQWLFDFWLYLVWVEHJDQWRPHQWLRQWKHGD\¶VGDWH
RUVKRZWKHGD\¶VQHZVSDSHUDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHLUYideo for authentication purposes. By 
April 2011, some witnesses featured in videos began showing their national identification cards 
WRSURYHWKHLULGHQWLWLHV³6+$0611´ 
Digital media became an intrinsic part of protests in the sense that the very organization 
of protests seemed centered around how they were going to be recorded and how the footage was 
to be distributed. Amateur videos became slicker, with activists taping the protests from multiple 
angles, such as rooftops to present an aerial view. Activists developed expertise in directing 
amateur videos² many times with the intention of making protests appear more crowded on 
camera. More importantly, the network of Syrian activists and news media grew stronger. 
Influential Arab Gulf news channels, mainly Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, gave extensive airtime 
to Syrian activists who would relay their reports on primetime news broadcasts² blurring the 
lines between witnessing, reporting, and lobbying. One also cannot ignore the role of Syrian 
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diaspora aFWLYLVWVZKRVH³EURNHUDJH´PHGLDZRUNKDVEHHQHVVHQWLDOLQSDFNDJLQJDQGSURPRWLQJ
footage by local videographers to news media (Andén-Papadopoulos, 2013).  
This slippage in defining citizen journalism has grave ramifications² not least on the 
lives of amateur reporters. According to the Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ), the Syrian 
conflict has claimed the lives of 73 journalists so far. The CPJ website defines journalists as 
³staff journalists, freelancers, stringers, bloggers, and citizen journalists -- people who cover 
QHZVRQSXEOLFDIIDLUVWKURXJKDQ\PHGLD´7KHZDU¶VYLROHQFHLQDGGLWLRQWRWKHJUHDW
restriction imposed on news media by the Syrian regime, expanded the outsourcing of the 
journalistic role to amateurs and activists on the ground. Almost since the beginning of the 
Syrian uprising, amateur media networks, such as the Shaam News Network (SNN), 
mushroomed to coordinate amateur media output. While in May 2011, the SNN described itself 
as a "group of patriotic Syrian youth activists... supporting the Syrian people's efforts for 
democratic and peaceful change" (Yazbeck, 2011), in 2014 its Facebook page states that it is 
³XQDIILOLDWHGWRDQ\JURXSRUSDUW\´DQGWKDWLWVRXWSXWKDVEHHQhas been ³verified and checked 
for credibility.´ Its development indicates the professionalization of Syrian amateur video 
production and distribution.   
Debates around the consequences of this professionalization, particularly in relation to 
the responsibility of news organizations, were reignited following the death in late 2013 of 18-
year-old Syrian, Molhem Barakat, who worked as a freelance photojournalist for Reuters news 
agency.  +LVFDVHKLJKOLJKWVKRZ³FLWL]HQMRXUQDOLVWV´DQG³VWULQJHUV´DUHVWLOOa form of unpaid or 
low-paid labor, who are ³voluntarily co-opted in projects of power that may have a therapeutic 
YDOXHLQµJLYLQJYRLFH¶WRWKHRUGLQDU\\HWXOWLPDWHO\UHSURGXFHORFDODV\PPHWULHVDQGJOREDO
LQHTXDOLWLHV´Chouliarki, 2012b, p. 12). Molhem was an enthusiast and activist in support of the 
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Syrian revolution. He first worked with the pro-revolution Aleppo Media Centre and then for 
Reuters (Kenner, 2014). As Kenner (2014) notes, Barakat ³took the sort of risks that would 
hRUULI\PRVWYHWHUDQMRXUQDOLVWV´ and one video  posted on YouTube shows him trying to aid a 
wounded rebel fighter in the midst of battle 6HH³7XEH7UXH´. He died while covering a 
battle between the Syrian army and rebels. His tragic story captures how the Syrian war forced 
news media to reassess how to balance their need and responsibility for covering a story versus 
the constraints and ethical obligations in using the work of amateurs.  
On the other hand, Syrian regime thugs were also keen on using digital media. Regime 
fighters used digital media to record and disseminate their violence and torture of civilians. 
Sometimes their techniques were a direct response to protest demands. When chanting the word 
³IUHHGRP´EHFDPHDUDOO\LQJFU\LQ6\ULDQSURWHVWVGR]HQVRIYLGHRVWDNHQE\UHJLPHILJKWHUV
would show them shouting DWDFLYLOLDQ³<RXZDQWIUHHGRP"´DQGSURFHHGLQJWREHDWDQGWRUWXUH
the defenseless civilian in horrific ways. As a report on Syrian opposition Orient TV 
(³WHOHYLVLRQ2ULHQW´2011) said:  
³There are many explanations for these videos. Some say they have been deliberately 
leaked to terrorize protestors and those thinking of joining them. Others suggested they are 
part of a business, where soldiers sell them to activists who submit them to the media. 
Others purport that the shabiha take the videos just to boast about them.´ 
Sometimes the use of digital media is so striking and unusual that commentators can only 
speculate about why videos were produced. One example is a video that shows Syrian soldiers 
herding about a dozen donkeys to line them within the frDPHRIDSKRQH¶VFDPHUD$IWHUWKH
donkeys got lined up, the soldiers begin to shower the donkeys with bullets until they are all 
O\LQJGHDGRQWKHJURXQG³nasser mahmoud´3). The video shows several soldiers 
10 
 
shooting the scene with their phones. Again bloggers and commentators were at a loss about 
how to explain the intentionality of the video (Hounshell, 2011), speculating that the 
livelihood of villagers was the target.  
As the Syrian uprising became more of an ongoing civil war, its changing nature 
paralleled the changes in the kinds of digital media practices involved. Digital media output 
became a battleground and a weapon of war. Different warring sides and their supporters on 
social media began to shoot and distribute horrific videos of killings and torture. One extreme 
example is a video that shows adults encouraging a child, who appears no older than ten 
years, to use a sword to behead a captured officer from the Syrian ruling Alawite minority 
VHFW³6\ULDQUHEHOV´$QRWKHUYLGHRVKRWLn the desert between Syria and Iraq, shows 
militants of the Islamic State (known by its former acronym ISIS² the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Sham) stopping three truck drivers and asking them questions about Islamic prayer, as if 
they were contestants in a game show. The purpose was to determine whether the drivers 
were practicing Sunni Muslims. When the drivers did not know the answer to a question 
about how to perform morning prayers, they were shot by the militants, who were taping their 
interaction with tKHGULYHUVDOODORQJ³6\ULDQ3HUVSHFWLYH´$QRWKHUZLGHO\FLUFXODWHG
Syrian amateur video shows a grotesque theatrical performance of an anti-regime rebel 
holding what he said was the heart of a dead regime soldier and threatening to eat it²while 
taunting other regime fighters that this would be their fate if they do not surrender (Wood, 
2013).  
As the war escalated, armed groups began to document their military advances in slick 
edited videos that are not only meant to recruit more supporters and militants or to intimidate 
enemies, but also as a showcase for Arab funders, mainly in the Gulf region, to show them 
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that their money is not going to waste and to ask for more funds (Harb, 2013). In this context, 
English-language media began calling the SyriDQFRQIOLFW³WKHILUVW<RX7XEHZDU´³Channel 
4,´ 2013).  In some videos, even people in extreme physical pain and under torture glance at 
WKHFDPHUDRIWKHLUWRUWXUHUV¶FHOOSKRQH²as if in a moment of consciousness that their pain 
and suffering is not private and will soon be available for all to see.  
Though the Syrian context perhaps provides the most dramatic examples of the myriad 
uses of digital media, the GLVFXVVLRQDSSOLHVHOVHZKHUH,Q/LE\DYLGHRVRI0X¶DPPDUDO-
4DGGDIL¶VNLOOLQJDUHRQHUHPDUNDEle example. There are several videos showing the moment 
that Libyan rebels found the dictator of 42 years hiding in a ditch near the town of Misrata, 
and proceeded to kill him. The video shows moments of chaos as rebels were seemingly 
coming to terms with the shock of finding a bloodied and pleading al-Qaddafi. We hear some 
rebels shouting Allahu Akbar *RGLVJUHDW2WKHUVFDOORXW³0LVUDWD´WKHFLW\WKH\KDLOIURP
Also, several times in the video, we see rebels pushing others out of the way saying, 
³3LFWXUH´DQG³/HWPHFDSWXUHKLVLPDJH´7KHVKRUWYLGHRLVORDGHGZLWKKXPDQHPRWLRQD
MXPEOHRIWKHUHEHOV¶HODWHGGLVEHOLHIDQGDO-4DGGDIL¶VWHUULILHGVKRFNAn earlier similar 
example is the amateur video showing the hanging of the late Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein 
by Iraqi militants in 2006. These examples raise the question of the performativity of these 
technologies; one cannot help but wonder whether and how al-4DGGDIL¶VRU+XVVHLQ¶Vfates 
would have changed if the rebels did not have cell phones with them to tape their capture or 
execution. It is important to ask then; does the use of digital media exacerbate acts of 
violence? How does the constant presence of digital media affect the behaviour of activists, 
torturers, and victims? These questions are beyond the scope of this article but the answer, I 
expect, lies in the analysis of the local context, rather than through the narratives and 
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GLVFRXUVHVDERXWGLJLWDOPHGLDVXFKDVWKDWRI³FLWL]HQMRXUQDOLVP´ZLWKLWVXQLYHUVDOLVW
assumptions about participation, democratization, and inclusion. 
On Western narratives & the local dimension 
Papacharissi (2010) suggests that discourses about how new technologies affect 
contemporary politics are RIWHQ³framed within utopian and dystopian polarities that represent 
hopes and fears projected onto these newer technologies´p. 3).  As mentioned above, Western 
news discourses about technology are often generated vis-à-vis the ways it is thought to be 
XWLOL]HGE\WKH:HVW¶VRWKHUV± in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The contrast between the 
framing of digital technologies vis-à-vis the Arab context in the 2000s and recently during the 
³$UDE6SULQJ´H[HPSOLILHVWKHGLVFXUVLYHRVFLOODWLRQEHWZHHQXWRSLDQDQGG\VWRSLDQvisions. 
These narratives, from the celebratory tone of most discussions of citizen journalism to the fear 
of digital media-enabled terrorists, tell us more about Western political discourse than digital 
media practices as such.  
As for academic analysis, much of the communications literature on the Arab 
uprisings discusses the role of new media in building networks and inciting collective action. 
The bulk of the literature (Elseewi, 2011, Howard & Hussein, 2011, Khamis et al., 2012, 
Faris, 2012, Castells, 2012) examines the short term effects of digital media in the 
PRELOL]DWLRQIRUSURWHVW0RUHRYHUDJHQHUDOWURSHLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQWKHXSULVLQJVLV³WKH
LGHDWKDWUDGLFDOSROLWLFDOLPDJLQDULHVFDQHPHUJHRXWRI´SDUWLFXODUPHGLDSUDFWLFHV³LQ
isolation from the myriad other generators of subjectivity embedded in phenomenal 
H[SHULHQFH´0DUNKDPp. 97). In contrast, following the 9/11 attacks and the US 
*HRUJH:%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V³:DURQ7HUURU´PXFKRI:HVWHUQMRXUQDOLVWLFDQG
academic discourse on the internet and new technologies highlights its dangerous potential 
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when used by terrorists. These discursive shifts suggest that there are no intrinsic social and 
political values within new technologies; rather, the values projected onto their use are 
dependent on larger questions related to world politics and the global circulation of 
hegemonic discourses.   
For example, Schudson (2006) has stated, ³[I]f there is any kind of politics that the 
new information technologies have disproportionately enabled, it may be international 
WHUURULVP´p. 13). :HLPDQQDVVHUWVWKDWWKH,QWHUQHWLV³LGHDOIRUWHUURULVWV-as-
FRPPXQLFDWRUV´p. 25): 
³[The Internet] appeared to offer unparalleled opportunities for a creation of a forum in 
ZKLFKWKH³JOREDOYLOODJH´FRXOGPHHWDQGH[FKDQJHLGHDVVWLPXODting and sustaining 
GHPRFUDF\WKURXJKRXWWKHZRUOG+RZHYHU«XWRSLDQYLVLRQVRIWKHSURPLVHRIWKH,QWHUQHW
were challenged by the proliferation of pornographic and violent content on the Web and 
by the use of the Internet by extremist organizations of various kinds. Groups with very 
different political goals but with the same readiness to employ terrorist tactics started using 
the network to distribute their propaganda«DQGHYHQH[HFXWHRSHUDWLRQV´ (pp. 19-20) 
With the rise of radical jihadi groups in Syria and Iraq, mainly ISIS, journalistic narratives about 
digital media shifted back to highly pessimistic scenarios. The ISIS invasion of the second 
largest Iraqi city, Mosul, and large swathes of the country with little resistance by the army was 
attributeGWRWKHLUVNLOOIXOXVHRIGLJLWDOPHGLD³In wars gone by, advancing armies smoothed 
their path with missiles. Isis GLGLWZLWKWZHHWVDQGDPRYLH´.LQJVO\VWDWHGDMRXUQDOLVWLQ
the British paper, the Guardian.  In fact, reports about ISIS ³VRFLDOPHGLDJHQLXV´%DUOHWW
through tweets, ³selfies´ on Instagram, smart phone applications, and branding techniques were 
ubiquitous on Anglo-American news media (See Berger, 2014, Irshaid, 2014, Kwong, 2014, 
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Speri, 2014). The frenzy was also expressed on US news comedy shows² for example, 
commentator Stephen Colbert (2014) DQQRXQFHGWKDW,6,6KDVLQYDGHG³Hashtagistan.´ 
Rather than an academic focus that parallels this alarmed media narrative, I am 
suggesting an approach that conceives digital media use in specific contexts from the ground up± 
DWWKHORFDOOHYHO$V$SSDGXUDLDUJXHVORFDOLW\LVD³IUDJLOHVRFLDODFKLHYHPHQW´WKDW
UHTXLUHV³GHOLEHUDWHSUDFWLFHVRISHUIRUPDQFHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVDQGDFWLRQV´ (pp. 179-180). 
Accordingly, the produFWLRQRIORFDOLW\LVVKDSHGE\VHYHUDOIDFWRUVPDLQO\³WKHQDWLRQ-state, 
GLDVSRULFIORZVDQGHOHFWURQLFDQGYLUWXDOFRPPXQLWLHV´ (p. 198) and the interactions and 
tensions between them. Kraidy and Murphy (2008) have called for using the work of the 
anthroSRORJLVW&OLIIRUG*HHUW]LQJOREDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQVWXGLHV*HHUW]VWDWHVWKDW³WKH
shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local, indivisible from their instruments and 
HQFDVHPHQWV´as cited in Kraidy & Murphy, 2008, p. 335).  The authors contend that the local is 
³LQKHUHQWO\G\QDPLFDQGGLDORJLFDOEXWQHYHUWKHOHVVDQHPSLULFDOO\DFFHVVLEOHµSODFH¶ZKHUHWKH
elaboration of meaning can be witnessed as it is enacted and negotiated by contextually situated 
DJHQWV´:KLOH.UDLG\	0XUSK\ apply this trans-local approach to global 
television formats, it can also orient how we theorize digital media practices in a globalized 
world. The agency and intentionality behind the use of digital media can only be understood in a 
locally-contextualized situatedness. While the frame of citizen journalism portrays the digital 
media user as an amateur journalist and a civic agent, digital media themselves tell us little about 
the intention of the user.  
Citizen journalism also focuses on the rationalist assumptions of journalism and 
citizenship. In the Syrian example, particularly the video that shows a Syrian rebel threatening to 
ingest the body parts of his enemies, how is one to understand the agency of the perpetrator and 
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the grotesqueness of the performance enacted in the midst of a battle and a war² without 
understanding what the local means in that battlefield? The man behind the video, Abu Sakkar, a 
laborer turned armed rebel, was interviewed by the BBC. Abu Sakkar tells the reporter (Wood, 
2013): 
³Put yRXUVHOILQP\VKRHV«They took your father and mother and insulted them. They 
slaughtered your brothers, they murdered your uncle and aunt. All this happened to me. 
7KH\VODXJKWHUHGP\QHLJKERUV«This guy [whose flesh he previously held in his hands] 
had videos on his mobile. It showed him raping a mother and her two daughters. He 
stripped them while they begged him to stop in the name of God. Finally he slaughtered 
them with a knife... What would you have done?´ (para. 14) 
Regardless of the truth behind these claims, this example indicates that the intentionality behind 
the use of digital media in warring Syria reflects the lived experiences of a violent and gruesome 
war² and it cannot be fully comprehended by those not affected by it. This example also 
highlights another aspect of digital media, which is its role as portable personal record. In this 
case, it allegedly indicts its user with his past crimes.  
 This complexity of the situation in Syria and the use of digital media in its conflict is 
exemplified by the controversy generated by the video of British street artist and film director, 
Banksy. The Banksy episode is another example of the dissonance between narratives and 
grounded digital media practices. In a short film, Banksy spoofs a video by Syrian rebels 
shooting GRZQDPLOLWDU\KHOLFRSWHU,Q%DQNV\¶VYHUVLRQUHEHOVpurportedly from the Aleppo 
Province, DUHVKRZQVKRXWLQJ³$OODKX$NEDU´ (God is great) as they look up to the sky to spot 
their fallen target. It turns out they have actually shot down the Disney flying elephant cartoon 
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character, Dumbo! Syria-ZDWFKHUVKDYHFULWLFL]HGWKHYLGHRIRULWV³FUXGHSROLWLFV´)LVKHU
2013). Syrian blogger, Nader Atassi (2013), writes: 
³[T]he imagery Banksy uses is offensive, no matter the intent. The imagery is, on the 
one hand, Orientalist: the buffoon-ish Arabs, savagely celebrating killing a poor 
animal«So what exactly is the message? That the Syrian regime warplanes are 
analogous to poor flying elephants? That the rebels in Syria are a bunch of ragtag 
buffoons going around trying to kill even the poorest creatures?´ (para. 2) 
5HJDUGOHVVRI%DQNV\¶VLQWHQW then, the film and the resulting controversy showed that, to 
outsiders, the videos coming out of Syria might as well be showing the killing of Dumbo. With 
the lack of understanding of the local, and the situated agency of people on the ground, most 
viewers see examples of digital media use in Syria through general frames that can barely make 
sense of its actors, their political intentions, and their media output.1   
On citizenship 
The invocation of citizenship and journalism in descriptions of digital media practices is 
the main narrative I focus on in this article. As I mentioned, another way to criticize this 
narrative is through a consideration of the intellectual genealogy. When applied to the Arab 
context, a new set of questions about the history of the concepts of citizenship and journalism 
must be considered. In communication, the frame of citizen journalism has roots in the 
theoretical tradition of the Habermasian public sphere with its emphasis on rational 
deliberation²framed within the nation-state. As Fraser (2012) has written ³SXEOLF-sphere theory 
has been implicitly informed by a Westphalian political imaginary: it has tacitly assumed the 
frame of a bounded political community with its own territorial state´p. 77)$VZLWK)UDVHU¶V
criticism of public sphere theory, I argue that the concept of citizen journalism is implicated in 
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this Westphalian imaginary and the modernist and rationalist bias of Western traditions of 
citizenship and journalism, which have different genealogies when situated in an Arab context.   
While citizenship is contested in Western scholarship, the meanings projected on 
citizenship in the Arab world capture the contentious and ongoing debate about the political 
legacy of Islam within the nation-state, which is the predicament that Muslims have faced for 
decades (Asad, 2003, Hallaq, 2013). This history is important in thinking of the assumptions that 
are made about the agency and political intentionality of digital media users and activists when 
their actions are conceptualized as citizen journalism. What kind of citizenship is enacted when, 
for example, an Arab activist reports and comments on current events during the Arab uprisings? 
What kind of citizenship, if any, is sought and imagined? 
Faulks (2000) GHILQHVFLWL]HQVKLSDV³DPHPEHUVKLSVWDWXVZKLch contains a package of 
rights, dutiHVDQGREOLJDWLRQV´p. ,W³is an ethic of participation, which only democratic 
V\VWHPVRIJRYHUQDQFHHQFRXUDJH´p. 107).  Citizenship thus is associated with democracy and 
is largely conceived as a membership category within the nation-state (Faulks, 2000). However, 
given the accelerating rates of immigration and the advent of globalization, theorists have been 
debating how to distance citizenship from the nation and the state (See Hoffman, 1995; Oommen 
1997; Faulks, 2000).  
Within the context of digital media, the discussion aims to criticize assumptions that 
citizenship is a universal concept; while, in fact, it invokes varied values and its meanings are 
mired in contentious historical debates. In modern standard Arabic, the translation of the word 
citizen is muwatin, which is derived from the word w-t-n, whose modern meaning is nation or 
nation-state. However, the term does not necessarily and exclusively reflect the relationship 
between an individual and a nation-state based on sets of rights and obligations. It can merely be 
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an expression of cultural affiliation. For example, it is as common to say µWKHSyrian PXZDWLQ¶ as 
WRVD\µWKH$UDEPXZDWLQ¶In fact, with the rise of Arab nationalism since the late Ottoman 
period onwards, the concept of watan as nation became popular and commonly used but it 
continued to take multiple meanings. For example, one person could express a sense of 
belonging and loyalty to more than one watan whether a village, country, or region (See Dawn, 
1993).2 Thus, since the meaning of nation was introduced into Arabic it took simultaneous 
meanings that designate different spatial and political imaginings.3  
Similarly, the concept of umma is vague but offers an imagination of a sense of belonging, 
where religious doctrine² and not place² is the compass of identity. Al Faruqi (2005) defines 
umma DV³WKH4XUDQLFFRQFHSWRILGHQWLW\´$FFRUGLQJWRKHUWKHumma is: 
³$UHOLJLRXVFRPPXQLW\ERXQGE\IDLWKDQGWUDQVFHQGLQJDOORWKHUPDUNHUVRIEHORQJLQJ«
(it) refers to that which, transcending the group is materialized in the tradition, laws, or 
religion that the JURXSKDVVRXJKWRUYROXQWDULO\IROORZHG«RQO\WKHJURXSWKDWIROORZVD
certain law is an umma.´ (p. 2) 
During the height of Arab nationalism, umma acquired nationalist and secular overtones when 
the term al-umma al-arabiyya or Arab umma became part of political parlance. However, as 
Asad (2003) contends, ideologically the Islamic umma is ³neither limited nor sovereign, for 
XQOLNH$UDEQDWLRQDOLVP¶VQRWLRQRIal-umma al-arabiyya, it can and eventually should embrace 
DOORIKXPDQLW\´p. 198). However, umma ± in the way it is employed politically ± can be an 
µLPDJLQHGFRPPXQLW\¶EDVHGRQWKHDGKHUHQFHWRIslamic law and on commitment to an Islamic 
political project, deemed more important than allegiances based on territory, language or 
ethnicity (see Asad, 2003).  
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Islamic thinkers have had different approaches to the concepts of watan and umma. Hardline 
Islamists completely reject the new notion of watan DVD³FRQFHSWIURPRYHUVHDV´WKDWVHHNVWR
FKDQJH³WKH,VODPLFLQWHOOHFWXDOV\VWHP´EDVHGRQWKHSROLWLFDOconfiguration of the umma (Al-
Sharif, N.D). The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, famously argued WKDW³D
SHUVRQ¶VQDWLRQDOLW\LVKLVGRFWULQH´UDWKHUWKDQKLVFRXQWU\ (Al-Ghannushi, 2010). Other 
contemporary Islamic scholars have sought to bridge the gap between watan and umma. The 
Qatar-based Egyptian cleric, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, has suggested the conceptualization of watan as 
the community of Islamic lands (Arabic: Ahl Dar al-Islam), which can include non-Muslims (Al-
Qaradawi, 2013). Similarly, the Islamic scholar and founder of the Tunisian Ennahda Party, 
Rashed al-Ghannoushi (2010), contends that the umma is a viable alternative conceptualization 
of political space by questioning whether the relation between the person and the socio-political 
collectivity has to be constructed within the confines of the nation-state, secularism, and 
democracy. These examples of Islamic scholars who call for the construction of a polity around 
Islamic doctrine are by no means exhaustive. They show a snapshot of the theoretical debate on 
governance and offer a glimpse into the particular tensions to be considered when theorizing 
civic agency in Arab and Muslim contexts. A parallel analysis is applied next in order to 
question and interrogate assumptions about the universality of journalism.  
On journalism  
The history of Arab news reflects a  diversity of competing approaches and 
conceptualizations of what journalism communicates, and how, despite the absence of 
functioning democracies, news outlets are used by governments and audiences to construct, 
negotiate, and contest collective ideas about religion, the nation-state, citizenship, and modernity. 
The ways different political actors in the Arab region conceptualized journalism throughout its 
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modern history shows the instability and the dramatic changes it has undergone and reflects 
unsettled deeply-rooted anxieties regarding identity. Of course these changing conceptions and 
uses of journalism are not unique to Arab contexts. In fact, many scholars have argued that there 
is a significant gap between how the academy discusses journalism, citizenship, and democracy 
and the way they are practiced on the ground. Mouffe (1999) argues that the Habermasian vision 
of deliberative citizenship, based on the ideals of rationality, does not reflect the antagonistic 
nature of democracy. In journalism studies, Zelizer (2012) critiques the worldview rooted in the 
Enlightenment that privileges rational discourse, links journalism and democracy, and presents 
an unnecessarily narrow understanding of journalism practices. Similarly, critical scholarship on 
citizenship points to diverse histories of different conceptualizations and performances of 
citizenship (Schudson, 1999) and to its varied contextual understandings (Longova, 2000, 
Turner, 2000, Dahlgern, 2009). My use of the Arab context simply highlights that journalism 
serves various functions and plays multiple roles mostly in authoritarian states. This historic 
approach to Arab journalism also shows that, like citizenship, it cannot be understood as a 
universal category and it is a limited descriptor of media practice.  
As Mellor (2007) argues, the story of Arab journalism experiences is hybrid as journalists 
balance their desire for change with difficult structural political and economic constraints. 
Following the independence of Arab countries in the early to mid-20th century, Arab journalism 
was subjected to the control of authoritarian regimes in the majority of Arab countries. Most 
Arab governments became the main actors in using journalism as the vehicle for their control 
over society and for attempts to shape national identities, articulate policies, and mobilize and 
control their populations. Governments used news media as a site for the negotiation of the 
relation between pan-Arab nationalism, nation-state allegiance, and Islamic religion. One of the 
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most important examples of this process in modern Arab history is the use of another 
revolutionary communication technology² radio² by the late Egyptian President Gamal 
AbdelnDVVHUWRSURPRWH$UDEQDWLRQDOLVP+HDGGUHVVHG(J\SWLDQVDQG$UDEVDV³WKH$UDE
SHRSOH´WKURXJKWKH(J\SWLDQUDGLRVWDWLRQ³Sawt al-Arab´7KH9RLFHRIWKH$UDEVZKLFK
began service in 1953. The defeat of Arab countries, led by Abdelnasser, in the 1967 war with 
Israel weakened the ideological power of Arab nationalism. Furthermore, the poor performance 
of Arab government media during and in the aftermath of the war led to the decline of radios like 
³Sawt al-Arab´DQGSDYHGWKHZD\IRUIRUHLJQUDGLREURDGcasters (Kraidy & Khalil, 2010), which 
addressed Arab listeners as an audience rather than a political community.  
In the realm of television news, evening news bulletins on state-owned television 
channels were the only audio-visual source of information in most Arab countries up until the 
1990s (Kraidy & Khalil, 2010). Governments used television media and news to directly 
communicate to their populations their hegemonic political identity projects in crude ways. The 
Libyan regime, for example, used news media to communicate a sudden shift in government 
rhetoric during the 1990s from one that had focused on Arab nationalism to one calling for 
African unity and promoting a pan-African identity. Libyan television news broadcasts reflected 
this shift, not only through the different ways news scripts were written, but also through 
changing the background studio map from that of the Arab world to the map of Africa. 
In the late 1990s, the Arab world entered the era of satellite television with the launch of 
the infamous Qatari-owned satellite news channel Al-Jazeera, which revolutionized journalistic 
discourse in the region and had a significant impact on the Arab media and political landscape. 
Al--D]HHUD¶VRULJLQDOHGLWRULDOVODQWUHIOHFWHGDQGLQIOXHQFHGSHUFHSWLons of Arab political 
identities through combining tropes of Arab nationalism, Islamism and Third Worldism (Kraidy 
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& Khalil, 2010). Since the launch of Al-Jazeera, the number of pan-Arab news channels 
mushroomed and many regional and Western countries funded their own twenty-four hour news 
stations in their pursuit of projecting political power onto the region, reflecting different news 
cultures.  
In the realm of print media, with the exception of a few mostly London-based pan-Arab 
dailies, most papers are published and distributed within individual Arab countries and used, to 
different degrees, to promote government ideology and discourse. For example, in authoritarian 
DQG%D¶WKLVW6\ULDuntil recently, the media is completely supervised by the government and 
reflects government ideology. In the occupied Palestinian territories, as Thawabtah (2010) 
argues, journalists balance their definitions of objectivity with defending the Palestinian cause 
EHFDXVHMRXUQDOLVPLVVHHQDV³DPHVVDJHUDWKHUWKDQDPHUHSURIHVVLRQ´ (p. 87). In Saudi Arabia, 
the Saudi academic Al-Ghathami (2004) focuses on the journalistic column as having played a 
crucial role in instigating debates around modernity and the relation between the individual and 
society, the rural and the urban, and men and women.  
A recent growing trend in the Arab world is the conceptulaization and practice what is 
labeled as Islamic journalism. TKHSRSXODU,VODPLFZHEVLWH³,VODPZHE´describes Islamic 
journalism DV³QHZVSXEOLFDWLRQVWKDWDUHLVVXHGDQGHGLWed by Muslims who care deeply about 
,VODPLFLGHRORJ\ZLWKLWVYDOXHVHWKLFVDQGSULQFLSOHV«DQGZKREHOLHYHWKDW,VODPLVWKH
eternal word of God that encompasses all worldly affairs´ (Al-Ghiashi, 2002). Some argue that 
the same guidelines that Muslim scholars use to verify the authenticity of the Prophet 
0RKDPPDG¶VVWDWHPHQWVWKHhadith, should be used for journalism, including citing multiple 
VRXUFHVDQGPDNLQJVXUHDFODLPGRHVQRW³KDUPthe innocent or falsify reality´ (Pintak, 2011, p. 
96).   
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³'H-WeVWHUQL]LQJ´GLJLWDOPHGLDGLVFRXUVH"  
In this above brief survey of histories of citizenship and journalism in the Arab world, I 
argued that both concepts have particular intellectual genealogies²mainly that they have been 
conceived and practiced in largely non-democratic systems. Intellectual debates about citizenship 
in Arab countries have long attempted to reconcile the political legacy of Islam with the nation-
state as the space of governance (Asad, 2003, Hallaq, 2013). The rationale of my argument 
relates to wider questions about de-Westernizing the academy. When criticizing that a certain 
FRQVWUXFWVXFKDVFLWL]HQMRXUQDOLVPLV³:HVWHUQ´DQGQRWDSSOLFDEOHWRRWKHUFXOWXUDODQG
political contexts, it is difficult to negotiate the politics of sameness and difference. The purpose 
of de-Westernization is to counter the claim that Western theory is universally applicable and to 
encourage the contribution of non-Western scholars, but at the same time it is misleading to 
assume that non-Western contexts are necessarily and essentially different. The de-
:HVWHUQL]DWLRQDSSURDFKDOVRVLPSOLVWLFDOO\PDLQWDLQVWKHLPDJLQHGJHRJUDSKLHVRIµWKH:HVW¶
DQGWKHµQRQ-:HVW¶,QGLVFXVVLQJWKHVWDWHRI$UDEFXOWXUDOVWXGLHV6DEU\FRQWHQGVWKDW
the preoccupation with de-Westernization often leads Arab scholars to lose sight of the cultural 
practices in the present tense and at the level of the everyday. As Khiabany and Sreberny (2013) 
DUJXH³Whe challenge for social analysis is to find a conceptual footing between imperialist 
intervention on the one hand and non-:HVWHUQH[FHSWLRQDOLVPRQWKHRWKHU´p. 489).  
This debate is implicated in the theorization of modernity, not least since both journalism 
and citizenship are often theorized as pillars of Western modernity. Mitchell (2000) refutes the 
conception of modernity as a Western experience that has been universalized. This belief, 
Mitchell suggests, posits non-:HVWHUQFRXQWULHVDVLILQDFRQWLQXRXVH[HUFLVHRIµFDWFKLQJXS¶WR
the levels of modernity experienced in the West. The discursive force of modernity, however, is 
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QRWLQLWVXQLYHUVDOLW\EXWLQWKHZD\LWQHFHVVLWDWHVDQXQPRGHUQµRWKHU¶DJDLQVWZKLFKLWLV
defined (See Watenpaugh, 2006). Mitchell (2000) contends instead that there is no single 
modernity but different stagings of it, as no representation can ever match the promise of the 
imagined original (Mitchell, 2000, p. xiv). For his part, Bhaba (2012) has discussed how, since 
the 19th century, Western grand narratives about universalism have eroded when they 
encountered cultural difference. He writes: 
³Reading from the transferential perspective, where the Western ratio returns to itself from 
the time-lag of the colonial relation, then we see how modernity and postmodernity are 
themselves constituted from the marginal perspective of cultural difference. They 
encounter themselves contingently at the point at which the internal difference of their own 
society is reiterated in terms of the difference of the other, the alterity of the postcolonial 
site.´ (p. 281) 
Applying this postcolonial framework to contemporary digital media, I have criticized how the 
conceptualization of digital media practices through a modernist and universalizing discourse 
about citizenship and journalism implodes when encountering the cultural and political 
difference exemplified by the uprisings in Syria and the Arab world.  
Conclusion   
Given the difficulty of conceptualizing acts of journalism and values of citizenship, the 
current use of the term of citizen journalism seems to adhere to the arbitrary definition RI³,
NQRZLWZKHQ,VHHLW´7KH$UDEXSULVLQJVSDUWLFXODUO\in Syria, demonstrate how digital media 
use on the ground complicates our assumptions about their relation with political and social 
agency. The citizen journalism frame circumscribes the critical imagination. It prescribes rather 
than describes what these digital practices signify. As such, it inadvertently imposes the 
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reference points of its own historical formation. This is not then simply a call to coin another 
neologism instead of citizen journalism. Rather, it is a criticism of the need to capture the myriad 
kinds of digital media practices in an all-encompassing concept. Without context, a 
comprehensive frame for digital media, such as citizen journalism, is bound to bracket off digital 
communicative practices deemed lacking in their cosmopolitan or democratizing effects. 
Accordingly, the article sought to de-link digital media practices from the nation-bound and 
deliberative communication frame of citizen journalism by highlighting the local level and the 
multiple antagonistic, affective, and sometimes violent, aspects implicated in digital media.  
As suggested earlier, it is insufficient to state that Western theory is inapplicable to other 
contexts. It is also crucial to re-think how research and theorization at large can benefit from 
thinking through varied intellectual histories. For instance, the multiple ways that describe, and 
the various imagined geographies invoked, in Arabic conceptualizations of the relation between 
an individual and a political community, such as watan and umma, can contribute to the 
theorization of citizenship. Similarly, it is important to learn from the experiences of journalism 
in different political settings. Furthermore, the uses and practices of digital media in the post-
uprisings Arab world have acquired an exceptionally important role in the political and social 
environment. The context of the uprisings then can reframe Western approaches and assumptions 
about digital media. Finally, despite the short history of digital media, it is apparent that²in 
relation to the Arab world² Western narratives about them oscillated between terrorism and 
democracy without sufficient intellectual engagement with the social action of digital media 
practice. The historicization of media practices and discourses is crucial in order to distinguish 
between media narratives and media practices.  
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1
 Here it bears mentioning that my focus on the Syrian and Arab context has broader 
applicability. The pictures of American soldiers torturing Iraqis in the Abu-Ghraib prison come 
to my mind, particularly the contrast between the digitally-captured images and the discursive 
celebration of these technologies as shaping democratic sensibilities and agents, be it in the 
Middle East or in the United States itself. 
2
 This dual use of the word muwatin has its roots in the original meaning of the word. In the 
Arabic dictionary, Lisan al-µArab, watan VLPSO\PHDQV³WKHSODFHWKDWRQHUHVLGHVLQWKHSODFH
RIDKXPDQDQGKLVORFDOLW\´)URPWKHVDPHURRWWKHYHUEawtana signifies the act of choosing a 
ORFDWLRQDVRQH¶VSODFHRIUHVLGHQFHDQGWKXVEHFRPLQJDmuwatin of that place. The initial 
association of watan with the term nation or nation-state occurred at the beginning of the 
encounter between Arab scholars and the Western world in the 19th FHQWXU\5LID¶D5DIL¶DO-
Tahtawi, one of the first Egyptian and Arab imams and students to study in France and the West 
in the mid-19th century translated the French national anthem, La Marseillaise (Tibi, 1990, 
1997). He translated ³O¶DPRXUGHODSDWULH´DVWKHORYHRIWKHwatan and, in his writing, was an 
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Arab pioneer in stressing that the love of a country is one of the prime virtues of civilization. 
However, he also described his Egyptian home village, Tahta, as his watan in an expression of 
reminiscence and belonging (Tibi, 1997, p. 87). 
3
 A similar notion that has multiple meanings is bilad, which means territories but can stand for 
µSODFHRIEHORQJLQJ¶RUµQDWLRQ¶)RUH[DPSOHWKH(J\SWLDQQDWLRQDODQWKHPVWDUWVZLWK³Biladi 
ELODGLELODGLODNLKXEELZDIXD¶GL´Biladi, to thee I devote my love and my heart). Palestinians 
commonly refer to their hometown or homeland as al-bilad, a term that is strategically vague and 
able to encompass Palestinians living within Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza. 
